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ty as to the future course of events, the emerging
rules will be such as to maximize the expected
welfare of the community at large. Conversely,
rules that are articulated after an outburst of conflict may be strategically biased. Once the future is
disclosed to them, parties will tend to articulate
rules that maximize their actual welfare, rather
than the expected welfare to be derived from an
uncertain future. Thus, ex ante norms should be
given greater weight in the adjudication process.
This predicament seems to be contradicted by
some scholars of international law and by the
empirical and anecdotal evidence on commercial
customary law. Bernstein ("Merchant Law In a
Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for
Immanent Business Norms." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144:1765 (1996)) examines customary rules that have developed in various modem
commercial trades. Her findings seem to indicate
that in the adjudication of business disputes, commercial tribunals tend to enforce customary rules
that are quite different from the business norms
spontaneously followed by the parties in the
course of their relationship. Rather, customary
rules develop around practices developed during
the conflictual phase of a relationship. In this
setting, Bernstein distinguishes between relationship norms and end-of-the-game norms. When
adjudicating a case, courts are faced with parties
who have reached the end point in their relationship. The end-of-the-game norms of the conflictual
phase thus tend to be enforced, while the cooperative norms developed in the course of their relationship remain outside the domain of adjudication.
The simple suggestion of this comment is that
the analytical efforts of the law and economics
scholars and the methodological rigor of economic
modeling may help us unveil additional dimensions
of the debate on the structure of customary law.
As always, Professor D'Amato is pushing the
boundaries of international legal theory towards
new directions and it is my personal hope that he
will consider a mutually beneficial exchange of
ideas with the economists and game-theorists
engaged in parallel undertakings.
Francesco Parisi
George Mason University
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Why States Are Bound By
Customary International Law
Supporters of the international legal system
often speak or write as if certain international
customs were "law" and binding. Customary
international law, to be "law", must claim to
bind the nations, states, persons or peoples
subject to its jurisdiction. This calls for an
explanation why such "laws" should be obeyed.
Various explanations have been offered for
why custom binds as law. Positivists, such as
Hans Kelsen, typically assert that states are
bound by customary law because they act as if
they were bound by customary law. Anthony
D'Amato's reformulation of customary law
suggests that states choose to be bound, because
customary law serves their interests in peace and
commerce. I will insist that customary law binds
persons, states, and other subjects of international law, whether they will or no, for the same
reason that any law binds anyone anywhere,
which is by providing the best available measure
of what would be the right thing to do in a given
set of circumstances. To the extent that proposed
norms do not do this, their status as "law" is
compromised, and they have little binding force.

Evidence of Law
Custom's status as international law was formally recognized by many states through the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, adopted by
reference through Article 92 of the United Nations
Charter. Article 38 of the Court's Statute characterizes "international custom" as "evidence of a
general practice accepted as law". The Court also
relies on international conventions "expressly
recognized by the contesting states"; on the general
principles of law recognized by "civilized" nations; and on the judicial decisions and teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, "as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law".
These four methods of finding the law have
deep roots in international legal theory. Hugo
Grotius discovered the law of nations ("jus
gentium") in custom ("usus"), the views of the
learned, and the will ("voluntas") of states (Belli ac
Pacis I.xiv), but explained that the underlying
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source of the law is the human need for society
(prolegomena.8), as explained by right reason
(II.i.5). Custom, will and learning discover the
dictates of reason to construct an international
society of states (prolegomena.17). So, for Grotius,
the customary law of nations corresponds to the
lex non scripta of domestic legal systems (I.xiv.2).
Nations develop customs either by deduction from
natural principles or from consent. In either case
their customs should be binding. Emmerich de
Vattel repeated and reformulated Grotius' observation (Droit des gens, preface, viii, and note f.),
but added that nations need society amongst
themselves much less than individuals do(preface,
xviii). Vattel insisted that custom and treaties both
derive whatever binding force they have from
antecedent natural law (preface, xxii), as deduced
through the natural liberty of nations, the
common welfare of states, and their interest in
trade (preface, xx).
The observations of Grotius and Vattel may not
have much bearing on contemporary lawyers'
sense of international custom, but they illustrate
the purposes that international custom serves in
determining the content of international law. As
the statute of the International Court of Justice
indicates, custom has never been so much a source
of law as it has been the "evidence" of international
law. When states make treaties, they indicate their
belief that they ought to be bound, in certain
circumstances. When the subjects of international
law develop and follow customs, they indicate
their opinion that they ought to act in certain
ways. When civilized nations recognize general
principles of law, their agreement is evidence that
such principles exist. When learned judges render
decisions, they must claim that the law somehow
requires the given result. The implication in every
instance is that law exists, and that certain indicia
give evidence of what the law is, in a given set of
circumstances.

possible, but one must be chosen. Domestic legal
systems often do this by "positive law", by which
I mean formal legislation, generated by a recognized process, and enforced by courts. Treaties
offer a partial parallel in the international sphere.
Between those party to them, treaties may be
considered as "legislation", in the same way that
contracts create "law" in domestic legal systems.
Parties to treaties may be assumed to know best
what should be done, in specified circumstances,
within certain restrictions, to protect the general
good, to prevent unconscionable results, or
violations of basic jus cogens, derived from nature.
Some "positivists" would look to legislation
alone determining the law. The law (on this theory)
is simply what those in authority say that it is,
and the "sources" of law all derive from some
determinate human will, without regard for the
purposes that law exists to serve. Such theories
do little to explain custom, which has no determinate source. Positivists must view customs as
tacit treaties, reflecting the will of those in authority, who tolerate their development, and suffer
them to persist. In international law this would
mean that customs bind states because those in
authority intend that they should bind states, and
have legislated, in a sense, by allowing the custom
to develop and survive.
Positive law certainly plays a part in international law, as when multilateral treaties clarify
previously disputed issues, through quasi-"legislation", but most of international law has less
obviously "legislated" origins. States can claim a
certain authority, when they agree, but often no
agreement exists. Even when states do agree, their
own legitimacy to have a voice on what the law is
may be questionable. There simply is not enough
positive law in the international sphere to build a
legal system on. Legal theories based on authority
need authorities to make them work, but international society has no universal authority, nor
any prospect of finding one.

Positive Law

International law, like all law, must claim to
deserve obedience. The mystery is what supports
this claim, without a recognized international
authority to promulgate rules. Domestic legal systems rest on the government's claim to discover or
clarify law and justice through established structures of power. No international authority can

To say that law exists to be found and obeyed is
not to say that law cannot be made, or made more
determinate through the deliberate acts of those in
authority (or others, in certain circumstances).
Laws exist, in part, to clarify social relations when
several equally viable arrangements would be
ASIL •
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make this claim and enforce it. So international law
must earn obedience by being persuasive, or right.
States or others asserting principles of international law may persuade (1) by force of arms, or (2)
by force of argument. When they persuade by
argument, states evoke obedience by convincing
themselves or others that certain rules deserve to
be obeyed.
Custom generates laws, which should be obeyed
when custom offers needed standards or rules to
coordinate international actors in the service of
justice. When several possible solutions exist to
problems of international interaction, custom may
identify the salient solution, much as a positive
law or treaty would do, if states could reach a more
formal agreement.
Custom may also identify the substance of law
in a deeper sense, by offering evidence of what
would be the most just solution, based on the
views of a wide variety of states and peoples. Opinio
juris, or the view that something is law, and binding, offers very good evidence of what is law, and
binding, if the opinion is widely shared and respected. Some might consider it "circular" to say
that widespread belief that something is international law constitutes good evidence of it actually being international law. This confuses the
issue by considering custom as a source of law,
rather than evidence of law, which derives its binding force from reason or justice, applied to the
purposes that international law exists to serve.

The Purposes of International Law
Like all law, international law derives it legitimacy from the purposes that it exists to serve, and
deserves obedience only to the extent that it is effective in doing so. Anthony D'Amato, for example,
suggests that international law exists to serve the
interests of peace and prosperity, through maintaining a system of states, that trade amongst
themselves. Such a system might avoid conflict by
taking the most recent resolution to any dispute between states as the default norm, to be
applied to the next similar conflict, unless one of
the parties objects, in which case a different resolution could be sought. Trade maximizes prosperity, and peace maximizes trade. On this theory
peace and prosperity both follow from respecting
recent precedents in all disputes, thereby avoiding conflict, and maximizing opportunities to trade.
Formulations such as this, that privilege peace
ASIL
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and prosperity over other aspects of justice and
the common good, slight some of the fundamental purposes that help customs and law to
crystallize around determinate principles and
rules. A dispute between two states may be
solved at times by the application of rules that do
not have much resonance elsewhere, as when
the Pope divided the Americas between Spain
and Portugal. In such circumstances no customary
rule emerges, and the law remains unchanged.
Perhaps the example is a poor one, but it would be
a mistake to say that "the governing rule that
emerges from any international controversy is the
birth of a rule of customary international law".
There would also need to be a widely shared
opinion (or practice) that this result was just and
binding as law.
In the absence of an international legislature,
inferences from the purposes of international law
(justice and the common good), constitute a
much more direct source of law than they would
in most domestic legal systems. Customary law,
discovered in the views and practices of state,
provides good evidence of law by revealing either
(1) what states or others have agreed to, or (2)
what all international legal actors should agree
to, because it is widely recognized to be just. One
might compare this to Coke's old view of the
common law or lex non scripta as the embodiment of reason, applied to the necessities of
human society, as worked out through generations of legal practice. The opinions of judges
constitute good evidence of the common law, but
they cannot change or create law, only find it.
The influence of their opinions depends on the
truth (and so on the persuasive value) of their
reasoning.

Treaties
Treaties can be evidence of international law in
just the same way that customs can, so long as
they reflect widespread recognition that certain
standards are law and binding; or help to make
one solution to international coordination problems salient over others. Treaties can be sources of
custom, to the extent that third parties observe or
endorse rules that treaties recognize as having
binding force.
Understanding the role of treaties and custom
as evidence rather than the sources of international law demonstrates how multilateral treaties may
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bind states and others even in areas where states
expressed reservations to the treaties in question.
If the treaty reflects a binding norm of international law, widely recognized as law by the
community of nations, this may be very good
evidence that it is law, notwithstanding the
reservations of even the most powerful states.
Treaties enter what one might call the international "common law" or lex non scripta in much
the same way that English statutes entered AngloAmerican common law through the widespread
recognition that they capture fundamental elements of the developed law of nations. Just as
Anglo-American common law after Coke "found"
the law, and did not make it, so does international custom finds the law (and does not make
it) with or without statutory assistance. In the
same way that chapter 29 of Magna Carta
represents a central element of the common law,
so fundamental that no statute or contract may
alter it, so too jus cogens exists in international
custom, so fundamental that no derogation will
be permitted from its strictures.
Conclusion
Customary international law is formed in much
the same way that common law was formed, as
common law was understood before legal positivism. No single holding can "change" or "make"
the law, but taken together the customs and practices of states offer very good evidence of what
the law is, which is to say, right reason, in a given
set of circumstances.
Whatever the resolution of an international
dispute, by force or by agreement, by arbitration
or by default, the bindingness of its "holding"
depends on its being right. The greater the international consensus that a given result is binding
as law, the greater the likelihood that the result
is, in fact, binding as law. But determining the
binding force of any "precedent" depends on
examining the circumstances in which consensus emerged, and the nature, legitimacy and trustworthiness of those consenting. "Opinio juris"
determines the content of customary international
law, but it matters whose opinion is expressed,
and why.
Mortimer Sellers
University of Baltimore
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Reflections On D'Amato's
"Reformulation" Of Customary
International law
I. Introduction
I was impressed with the fresh thinking that
Professor Anthony D'Amato demonstrated in his
short article reformulating customary international law. To me, many of his non-traditional ideas
are acceptable or nearly acceptable. For example,
I agree with his views on the following. First, that
the "international legal system itself" has a role to
play in the sense that the existing system contributes to or affects the formation of new rules of
customary international law ("CIL") (and of
conventional law as well). Second, that the objectives of the international legal system are or should
be, inter alia, the avoidance of war and the
maximization of each nation's wealth, although
we must bear in mind that such objectives have
been set by the States. Third, that the international
community is in need of "rules that point toward
peace and interdependence and away from war
and autarky" while there are other just and
legitimate goals that must be served. Fourth, "the
felt need of nations to engage in international
trade" has given rise to numerous rules of
international law, although I believe the need to
engage in non-trade exchanges and intercourse
(cultural, political, military, etc.) has played an
equally important role. Fifth, "a nation can become
richer by trade than by conquest" although, in the
example of Japanese aggression of China and the
Pacific region, Japan's policy was largely motivated, not simply by economic reasons, but also
by its desire for political and military power and
domination. Sixth, "if two states consent to a rule
that governs the resolution of a controversy, and
choose to express their consent in a treaty (rather
than tacitly, or by an exchange of correspondence), the treaty format does not invalidate the
consent". I may go a step further by saying that
treaties, with the exception of those entered into
under duress or fraud, represent the strongest
evidence of consent or compromised will of States.
I also share D'Amato's views on other points,
however, I would like to make some comments
and observations on the following matters:
The debate on opinio juris;
The international legal system as a player;
The formation of dispute-resolving customary
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